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Does Anti-Competitive Regulation Matter for Productivity? 
Evidence from European Firms
* 
 
Using firm-level data for a sample of European countries, we focus on the effects that 
product-market regulations have on firm-level TFP growth. We proxy regulatory burdens 
using the OECD indicators of sectoral non-manufacturing regulations. These allow 
accounting for both the direct effects of sectoral regulation on within-sector performance and 
the indirect effects of sectoral regulation on firms in other sectors through intersectoral input-
output linkages. Our econometric specification of TFP is based on a “neo-Schumpeterian” 
empirical specification in which productivity improvements depend on growth at the global 
technological frontier and a catch up term. We assume that regulation can affect productivity 
growth both directly and by slowing down the rate of catch up. We find that product market 
regulations that curb competitive pressures tend to reduce the productivity performance of 
firms. The negative effect is particularly strong on firms characterised by an above-average 
productivity growth. Domestic regulations that affect all regulated firms in the same way seem 
to be more important than border regulations in this context. 
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In  almost  all  industrialised  economies,  governments  intervene in  product  markets  through  regulatory 
policies,  particularly  in  services  industries.  Regulation  in  product  markets  is  generally  motivated  by 
market failures, including monopoly conditions, externalities and asymmetric information. However, if 
poorly designed, product market regulations may also affect the degree of competition between firms by 
raising barriers to entry, placing restrictions on product choices or firm operations, or granting protection 
to incumbent special interest groups. Such anti-competitive effects of regulations can, in turn, limit firms‟ 
incentives to maximise efficiency and innovate. While some countries have managed to address public 
interest concerns in non-manufacturing sectors without much harm to competitive forces, other countries 
–particularly in continental Europe- have reduced the dynamism of some  of these industries through 
excessively strict regulation. In this paper we relate anti-competitive regulatory policies and firm-level 
productivity growth in downstream sectors in 10 European countries, focusing on ways in which ill-
designed regulations can harm productivity and not on the potential benefits of appropriate regulations.  
2. Measuring regulation, inter-industry linkages and firm productivity  
Indicators of product market regulations 
Our measure of regulation is a comprehensive set of policy indicators assembled at the OECD on the 
basis of extensive surveys of national regulatory practices in services industries across sectors, countries 
and time. These industry-specific product market regulation (PMR) indicators cover two broad groups of 
services sectors: network industries, including energy (electricity and gas), transport (air, rail and road 
transport) and communication (post and telecommunications); and retail trade and professional services. 
They quantify anti-competitive restrictions in regulatory domains such as State control, barriers to entry, 
involvement in business operations, and, in some cases, vertical integration and market structure.
2 
The effects of policy-induced rigidities in non-manufacturing industries are not limited to these sectors 
themselves, but can also generate trickle-down effects into other sectors by raising the costs or lowering 
the quality of intermediate inputs, particularly in the case of services inputs where import competition is 
limited.
3  Hence we  pre-multiply  the sector-specific regulation  indicators for services ind ustries by  a 
matrix of input-output coefficients for 39 sectors, on the basis of the 2000 input -output tables for the 
United States. Using data from the United States –which are not part of our estimation sample- avoids the 
possible endogeneity of national input-output coefficients to national market characteristics such as the 
degree  of competition.
4 This results in an  indicator matrix  that we call regulation impact indi cators, 
calculated as: 
                                                           
2   See Conway and Nicoletti (2006) and Woelfl et. al. (2009) for a complete description of the OECD PMR 
indicators, which are also available on line at www.oecd.org/eco/pmr . 
3   Bourles et al. (2010) present a theoretical model of how productivity may be affected by the degree of 
competition in upstream sectors.  
4   This strategy is similar to Rajan and Zingales (1998), who use measures of financial dependence of US 
industries  in  a  cross -country  regression  setting.  The  underlying  assumption  is  that  the  US  has  a 
comparatively strong degree of competition in most n on-manufacturing sectors and thus US coefficients 
may be adequate proxies of intersectoral input-output relations in the absence of competition-reducing 
policy distortions. Moreover, the data quality of the US Input-Output matrix seems to be superior to those 
of a number of other countries in our sample.                             
  




where subscripts c  denote countries, j and j' industries (where j' is defined for  the above-mentioned 
regulated services industries only) and t time. wjj‟ are input-output coefficients measuring the intensity 
with which industry j relies on services industry j‟. Our identifying assumption is that sectors that are 
more dependent on a given kind of services inputs should be more affected by a lack of competition in 
this upstream sector. The so-constructed regulation impact indicators RI cover 39 sectors that use the 
outputs of services industries as intermediate inputs. Note that for services sectors, the cross-diagonal 
elements of the input-output matrix are often large.  
The firm-level database 
We relate these regulation impact indicators to firms‟ productivity, using firm-level data drawn from the 
Amadeus database of the Bureau van Dijk. Our firm-level sample includes ten European countries for 
which the Amadeus database has a good coverage of firms,
5 over the years 1998 to 2004. As any firm-
level data set, the raw Amadeus data contain missing values for some variables that are required for the 
productivity estimates. This implies that once TFP estimates are obtained, we are in fact left with a 
different sample from the original one. In order to ensure representativeness of our effective firm -level 
sample along the three dimensions country, sector and size groups, we resample the original Amadeus 
data set. In a first step, we obtain information about the true underlying population o f firms above 20 
employees along these three dimensions from the Eurostat Structural Business Statistics database for the 
year 2000. The size group below 20 employees had to be discarded due to an un satisfactory coverage in 
the Amadeus data. Then we set the total sample size to 100,000 firms (not observations) and divide this 
number into size-sector-country strata according to the true population. As a final step, random draws 
with replacement from each size-sector-country strata in the TFP sample are taken  until the weight of 
each strata corresponded to its population weight. The results of this resampling procedure are shown in 
Figure 1, where Panel A compares the size distributions of our estimation sample with the true 
population, while Panel B does the same for the industry distribution. In both cases, our re-sampled firm-
level data set comes very close to the true population.  
                                                           
5   Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. Figure 1.  Firm population  vs. Estimation Sample after resampling 
 





TFP estimates are obtained using a superlative index number approach (see Caves et al. 1982a,b, and 
Griffith et al. 2009 for an application), which –unlike TFP estimates based on parametrisations of the 
production function- allows comparisons in levels across countries and sectors. Following Griffith et al. 
(2009), the superlative index measures of TFP growth and TFP level in firm i at time t are calculated as a 
function of value added Y and the two input factors labour and capital, denominated x
z (with z=1,2): 
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j  is the average of the factor share in firm i and the geometric mean 
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z
it =1 and z ˃
z
i=1. Note 
that as a robustness check, section 5 presents results on the basis of TFP estimates obtained through the 
semi-parametric estimation technique of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
6 In both cases we use a value 
                                                           
6   Note that it is not possible to follow the methodology of Olley & Pakes (1996). The reason is that we do 
not have primary information on investment in Amadeus so that investment has to be calculated as the 
residual between current and lagged capital stock after correcting for depreciation. This clearly violates 
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Population Sampleadded specification, based on primary information for value added, correcting for extraordinary profits. In 
those cases where primary information on value added was not available we imputed value added as the 
residual between operating revenue and material inputs. For capital stocks we use primary information on 
net capital stocks. For labour we use primary information on the total wage bill. Nominal values are 
deflated using price indices from the EUKLEMS or OECD STAN databases.  We do not use estimated 
MFP  values  which either the  coefficient  on  capital stocks  or  the  wage  bill is  negative.  Productivity 
observations for which the sum of the coefficients is smaller than 0.6 are also dropped. 
3. Empirical approach 
The regression approach we use for relating firm productivity to the regulation impact indicators is based 
on  a  catch-up  specification  of  firm-level  productivity  whereby,  within  each  sector,  the  production 
possibility set is influenced by technological and organisational transfer from the technology-frontier 
firms (measured as the 5% most productive firms in sector s and year t in our sample of countries) to 
other firms and on the distance of the firm to the technological frontier.
7 This specification is consistent 
with recent models of endogenous growth like Acemoglu et al. (2003) or Aghion and Howitt (1998, Ch. 
8) in which productivity growth depends on both the ability to catch up and the ability to innovate. We 
model firm-level TFP for a given firm i in country c, industry s at time t as an auto-regressive distributed 
lag ADL(1,1) process in which the level of TFP is co-integrated with the level of TFP of the frontier firm 
F. Formally, 
 
icst ct s cst Fcst Fcst icst icst RI A A A A                  1 3 1 2 1 1 0 ln ln ln ln   (4) 
where Aicst is the TFP level of a non-frontier firm i, AFcst is the TFP level at the technological frontier F, RI 
is the regulation impact indicator, and γs , γct are sector and country-year fixed effects, respectively. 
Finally, ʵicst  is a random error term. Under the assumption of long-run homogeneity   0+  1+  2 = 1), the 
ADL(1,1) process in equation (2) has the following Error Correction Model (ECM) representation: 
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Equation 5 is the baseline specification of the policy-augmented TFP equation. The inclusion of dummy 
variables for each country-year combination implies that we control for all possible omitted factors that 
are  specific  to  each  country  in  each  year, which  substantially  reduces  concerns  about  a  possible 
endogeneity of policies and reverse causation. The coefficient  3 is identified using only cross-industry 
variation within the same country and year, which is possible because of the interaction of the original 
PMR regulation indicators with the industry-specific Input-Output coefficients. Since the identification 
strategy is based on comparisons of changes across industries within countries and year, compared across 
different countries and years, it can be given a difference-in-difference interpretation.
8 Standard errors are 
clustered by country and sector to allow the error term to be correlated across  firms and time within 
sectors in the same country (Moulton, 1991, Bertrand et al. 2004).  
The analysis focuses on productivity growth of incumbents across different industries and countries. 
Reallocation of productive inputs and outputs via the entry and exit of firms cannot be explored with the 
                                                           
7   In the robustness checks based on Levinsohn-Petrin TFP estimates, we use a national productivity frontier 
definition because these TFP estimates come from country-specific production function estimates. One of 
the advantages of the superlative index measure is that it avoids this national frontier definition.  
8   See Rajan and Zingales (1998) for a similar estimation approach. Amadeus data, which do not accurately distinguish between entry into the market and entry into the 
sample or mergers, and between exit from the market and from exit from the sample. We can look at the 
role of reallocation among incumbents for productivity developments, however, by singling out those 
firms that are characterised by a fast catch-up to the productivity frontier (those that have approached the 
frontier faster than the median firm in the same country and industry over the last year) and interact an 
indicator variable for these firms with the regulation impact indicator. This allows us to test whether these 
“dynamic” firms are affected differently by anti-competitive regulation.  
The  PMR  regulation  indicators  also  allow  a  further  breakdown  of  regulations  into  purely  domestic 
regulations that apply to all firms operating in the regulated services industries regardless of their national 
origin, and rules that affect foreign direct investors in particular. Given that foreign direct investment 
(FDI) is often more relevant for cross-border market entry in these sectors than arms-length exports and 
that tariffs were zero for trade within the European Union throughout our sample period, we interpret this 
breakdown  as  distinction  between  the  effects  of  upstream  domestic  regulation  and  upstream  border 
regulation on domestic firms, and report distinct estimates for these two aspects of services regulation.  
4. Results 
Table 1 presents estimates of the baseline specification of the productivity equation for the regulation 
impact indicators in column 1 and for the additional distinction between domestic and border regulations 
in column 2. We find that outward shifts in the technological frontier (labelled frontier growth in the 
table) increase the productivity of follower firms, and that productivity growth increases in the distance to 
the  technology  frontier  (TFP  gap  in  the  table),  reflecting  some  degree  of  conditional  productivity 
convergence.
9 Our main variable of interest, the coefficient estimate for the regulatory impact variable ( 3 
in  equation  5),  has  a  statistically  significant  negative  coefficient,  consistent  with  the  idea  that  more 
stringent product market regulation upstream reduces the productivity of firms in downstream sectors. 
When we further distinguish between domestic and border regulations, we find that this result is mainly 
driven by domestic regulations, while border regulations do not seem to have statistically significant 
effects.       
When we add an additional distinction between more and less dynamic firms in columns 3 and 4, we 
obtain a larger coefficient estimate for firms with an above-average catch-up rate with the productivity 
frontier, and the difference is statistically significant as shown in the F-test at the bottom of the table. 
When  we  then  distinguish  between  domestic  and  border  regulations  we  find  that  while  domestic 
regulations have a strong and statistically significant effect on both dynamic and non-dynamic firms, 
border regulations have a statistically significant effect on dynamic firms only, while the effect on non-
dynamic firms is still estimated with a large standard error.  
 
                                                           
9   This is a standard finding in line with previous cross-country evidence at the sectoral level (Griffith et al., 
2004; Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003, Conway et al., 2006 and Inklaar et al, 2008) and national evidence at 
the firm level (Griffith et al. 2009, for the United Kingdom). Table 1.  Regulation and TFP: the effects of firm-level heterogeneity 
 
TFP is measured as a superlative index, calculated as described in equations 2 and 3 in the main text. Standard Errors are in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining 
and construction are excluded, as are public administration, education and health sectors.   
1. Dynamic firms are defined as firms that catch-up to the global frontier in their respective sector. 
 
5. Robustness Checks 
In order to evaluate the robustness of our findings, we check whether they are robust to an alternative 
definition of productivity and to the inclusion of additional variables that may affect the firm productivity. 
Table 2 replicates columns (1) and (3) of Table 1, using TFP estimates obtained via the semi-parametric 
method  suggested  by  Levinsohn  and  Petrin  (2003).  These  estimates  are  based  on  an  estimation  of 
country-  and  sector-specific  production  function  coefficients,  with  TFP  being  the  residual  of  the 
production  function. The method  uses  material  inputs  in  order  to  proxy  for  unobserved  productivity 
shocks, which could create biased input coefficients in ordinary least square estimates. One drawback of 
the method is that because the TFP estimates come from country- and sector-specific parameterisations of 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable
Overall regulation
Border vs domestic 
regulation
Overall regulation
Border vs domestic 
regulation
Frontier Growth 0.065 *** 0.071 *** 0.145 *** 0.152 ***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
MFP Gap, t-1 -0.113 *** -0.126 *** -0.135 *** -0.149 ***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005)
Regulation, t-1 -0.093 ***               
(0.028)               
Regulation, t-1* Dynamic -0.111 ***               
(0.031)               
Regulation, t-1* Non-dynamic -0.075 ***               
(0.030)               
Dynamic firm dummy 0.139 *** 0.140 ***
(0.005) (0.006)
Regulation domestic, t-1 -0.073 ***               
(0.027)               
Regulation border, t-1 -0.091               
(0.077)               
Regulation dom., t-1 * Dynamic -0.077 ***
(0.024)
Regulation dom., t-1 * Non-dynamic -0.059 **
(0.025)
Regulation border, t-1 * Dynamic -0.167 **
(0.083)
Regulation border, t-1 *Non-dynamic -0.129 *
(0.078)
Dynamic = Non-dynamic (F-test) 3.84 **
Observations 217797 182104 217797 182104
R square 0.10 0.11 0.23 0.25
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Dynamic vs non-dynamic firms
1the production function, one cannot draw comparisons across countries, which implied that we had to 
define the productivity frontier as the average productivity of the top 5% of firms within the same sector 
and country, while the TFP index results are based on a global productivity frontier. This may be the 
reason why the estimated coefficient for the TFP gap between a firm and the technological frontier is one 
of the coefficients that differ most between Tables 1 and 2.  
Our main findings, however, are quite similar using this different productivity definition. The coefficient 
for regulation remains significant, although now only at the 10% level, in our baseline specification. 
When  we  distinguish  between  the  regulation  effect  on  dynamic  and  non-dynamic  firms,  it  loses  its 
statistical significance for the non-dynamic firms, and stays highly significant for the dynamic firms. Note 
that even though both coefficients are statistically significant in Table 1, the estimated effect for dynamic 
firms  is  larger  using  the  TFP  index  definition  as  well.  This  may  suggest  that  regulation  hampers 
particularly those firms that are on an upward trajectory of catching up with the best firms in the industry.  
 
Table 2.  Using Levinsohn-Petrin TFP estimates and country-specific frontier  
 
TFP is measured as a superlative index, calculated as described in equations 2 and 3 in the 
main text. Standard Errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining and construction are 
excluded, as are public administration, education and health sectors.  Dynamic firms are 
defined as firms that catch-up to the national technology frontier in their respective sector.  
 
As  a  second  robustness  check,  we  introduce  measures of  labour  market  regulations  and  of  financial 
development into the regression, to check whether our estimated regulation effect may be due to cross-
country correlations between different policies. However, it should be stressed that our specifications 
presented in Table 2 always include country-specific year dummies that remove all country-wide changes 
in regulatory or institutional settings. This limits the degree to which most other policy changes could bias 
our findings on product market regulations even when they‟re not explicitly controlled for.  
(1) (2)
Variable Baseline Dynamic vs non-dynamic firms
Frontier growth 0.044 *** 0.182 ***
(0.009) (0.012)
TFP Gap, t-1 -0.059 *** -0.068 ***
(0.008) (0.008)
Regulation, t-1 -0.055 *
(0.032)




Dynamic firm dummy 0.121 ***
(0.005)
Observations 208284 208284
R square 0.08 0.19
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes YesWe capture labour market regulation by exploiting an indicator of employment protection legislation 
(EPL)  created  by  the  OECD  (OECD,  2010).  This  indicator  measures  the  stringency  of  regulations 
affecting  the  hiring  and  firing  of  workers.  EPL  tends  to  raise  labour  adjustment  costs  possibly 
discouraging firms to innovate and adopt new technologies, both of which may require adjusting the 
workforce to  reorganise  the  production  process. The  effect  of  stringent  EPL on  TFP is  likely  to  be 
stronger  in  industries  that  are  characterised  by  inherently  large  job  turnover  rates  because  of  more 
frequent fluctuations in demand or wider technological shocks. For this reason, we interact the EPL 
indicator with a measure of job flows at the industry level from the United States in order to obtain a 
variable that varies at the country and sector level.
10  
In addition to considering labour market policies, we proxy  for the degree of financial development by 
using the sum of  two standard indicators of financial i ntermediation and the structure of financial 
systems: the ratio of bank credit to the private sector to GDP; and the share of stock market capitalisation 
in GDP.  These indicators capture broad patterns of financial development and do not distinguish between 
sectors of the economy. To consider the possibility that financial development influences productivity 
outcomes differently depending on the extent to which firms in different sectors rely on external finance, 
we interact the synthetic indicator of financial development with a sector-specific measure of dependence 
on external finance (following Rajan and Zingales, 1998) . The latter measure is constructed from the 
average ratio of debt to fixed assets across firms at the industry level (see Inklaar and Koetter, 2008, for a 
similar approach). In order to limit the possible endogeneity of this variable, we construct it only on the 
basis of firms from the United Kingdom, arguably the economy with the most developed financial market 
in our sample. Hence, the amount of external finance used by UK firms in different sectors is probably the 
best available proxy for the technologically -driven differences in exposure to external finance across 
sectors.
11 Given that financial development is likely to have a positive effect (if any) on TFP, because it 
may improve firms‟ options for making productivity-enhancing investments regardless of current cash-
flow, the expected sign on this variable is positive.  
Table 3 replicates our main regressions including these two additional policy measures. Our findings with 
respect to product market regulation are not affected by the inclusion of these additional controls. In both 
regressions, the coefficients of these additional explanatory variables are estimated with large standard 
errors  and  are  not  statistically  significant  at  the  conventional  level.  There  are  a  number  of  possible 
explanations for this.  Most importantly, our sample of mostly continental European countries (with the 
United Kingdom being the only exception to this) implies that there is not much variation in these policy 
variables. By extending our sample to other non-European countries, there might be enough variation to 
estimate a statistically significant effect. While it would be beyond the scope of this paper to explore these 
questions,  we  nonetheless  take  comfort  from  the  fact  that  the  product  market  regulation  indicators 
remains statistically significant even once other policy dimensions are controlled for.  
                                                           
10   Flows  in  the  United  States  are  used  as  a  benchmark  because  of  data  availability  at  a  fine  level  of 
disaggregation and because the United States is one of the least regulated labour markets in the OECD 
and  its  job  flows  are  likely  to  characterise  well  the  technology and  market-driven  need  for  labour 
reallocation of different industries. 
11   We have also tried a different sectoral measure of external dependence on finance, based on Compustat 
data for the US. This is a similar measure as the one originally employed by Rajan and Zingales (1998), 
except that it uses more recent data. Using this measure instead of the one employed below, we find the 
same results for product market regulation . It should be stressed, however, that the indicator used in 
Table 3 – the industry-level averages of the ratio of debt to fixed assets in the United Kingdom – drawing 
from  the  Amadeus  database  that  also  covers  unlisted  businesses  is  arguably  more  appropriate  to 
characterise the average dependence of external  finance  than a  measure based on Compustat  for the 
United States that only considers larger listed businesses.  
Table 3.  Controlling for additional policy variables 
(using superlative index TFP and global frontier)  
 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *. **. *** indicate statistical significance at the 10.5 and 
1% levels, respectively. Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining are excluded, as are public 
administration, education and health sectors. Dynamic firms are defined as firms that catch-








Variable Baseline model Dynamic vs non-dynamic firms
Frontier growth 0.066 *** 0.148 ***
(0.008) (0.010)
TFP Gap, t-1 -0.113 *** -0.135 ***
(0.009) (0.010)
Regulation, t-1 -0.090 ***               
(0.031)               
Regulation, t-1*Dynamic -0.110 ***
(0.034)
Regulation, t-1*Non-dynamic -0.075 **
(0.032)
Dynamic firm dummy 0.138 ***
(0.005)
Labour Market Regulation 0.006 0.003
(0.038) (0.038)
0.880 0.930
Financial Development 0.006573 0.003249
(0.011) (0.012)
0.570 0.780
Dynamic = Non-dynamic (F-test) 3.25 *
Observations 209351 209351
R square 0.08 0.22
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes6. Conclusion 
In  this  paper,  we  shed  some  light  on  the role  of  product  market reforms  for  firm-level  productivity 
patterns for a number of European countries. We use a large comparable panel data set of European firms, 
estimate firm-level productivity and relate it to detailed indicators of anti-competitive product market 
regulation. Our results confirm previous evidence from country studies that the level of competition may 
affect aggregate productivity and growth (see Aghion and Griffith, 2005 for a detailed theoretical and 
empirical analysis). In particular, our results suggest that product market regulations that curb competitive 
pressures tend to reduce the productivity performance of firms. Moreover, such regulation may have 
negative effects on allocative efficiency because they have a disproportionally strong effect on firms 
characterised by an above-average productivity growth. Domestic regulations that affect all regulated 
firms in the same way seem to be more important than border regulations in this context. 
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